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Summary 
This article deals with reliability problems of mechanical systems. For reliability 
calculations a multiperiod probability model is introduced. Interactions among non-
independent elements are derived from qualitative expert estimates. The example of a tower 
crane serves for the illustration of reliability analysis. Based on operating failure statistics the 
em pirical outfall curve and the fitting theoretical distribution function are established. The effect 
of interactions modifying the reliability of the system is illustrated by considering external 
environmental parameters. 
Introduction 
Mechanical systems are exposed to unfavourable influences during 
operation, as a result of which their value in use is decreasing, and their 
operational characteristics are gradually worsening. These damages caused by 
physical and external factors appear as changes of the geometrical size and 
shape of material structure and surface quality and also of other characteristics. 
The technical--economical aging leads to depreciation of machines. The fall-
offin operational efficiency is a time-dependent process, caused by wearing out, 
overloading and aging. Wearing out-which can be measured best-appears 
as physical wear, corrosion and fatigue. Among the reasons of overloading 
improper use and great significant, unexpected environmental changes can be 
mentioned. Finally, aging means the irrevocable changes in material structure. 
The number of impairing states arising during the lifecycle of a 
mechanical system is infinite. The various effects causing impairment are 
frequently closely interdependent. One should know their origins, motives and 
forms when organizing both preventive maintenance and repairing. 
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The reliability of mechanical systems 
Mechanical systems are loosing their productive capacity in a random 
manner. It can generally be explained by one of the following facts: 
- the operational conditions of the system can be characterized by randomly 
changing load, temperature etc., 
- all the external parameters are constant, but there are random changes and 
processes within the structure of the material, or around joints etc. 
One of the most important criteria of a mechanical system is the ability to 
work reliably during a given period of time, and to meet all the technical 
parameters defined for its proper use. Reliability is the ability of an object to 
meet (within given limits) those requirements of practical use which are in 
accordance with its characteristics. Reliability is 100%, when no failure can be 
observed among very many objects, during nominal workshop load. 
Obviously, such an absolute reliability can not be reached, since a significant 
part of impairments is random, and not all the failures can be avoided by 
preventive maintenance. However, having all the necessary reliability 
parameters, the ideal situation can be approximated by systematic planning. 
The level of technical reliability has a significant influence on safety of life and 
property, on repairment costs and idle time. 
The impairing behaviour of a mechanical system is defined by the 
impairments of the system elements. There are very many factors influencing 
impairments; that is why system elements fall out stochastically. Operating 
time is the very working time during which the whole machine, unit or 
component reaches the limit of its productive capacity [2]. Fig. 1 shows that 
the operating time of a system is determined by the very element with the 
shortest operating time. The next outfall is caused by the element with the next 
longer operating time etc. (It is assumed that impaired elements are 
immediately replaced). 
When many elements fall out at the same time, a total overhaul is needed. 
This is a favourable solution from reliability's point of view. The situation on 
Fig. 1 is disadvantageous, since all the elements have different outfall times, 
consequently maintenance costs and idle times are high. 
Reliability requirements can, however, be very easily defined, but to meet 
them in the practice is a little bit harder. It is, therefore, a more feasible solution 
to raise reliability level of the single elements. Dimensioning for life is quite 
unmatured, and that creates difficulties in planning. 
In the literature very useful statistics are to be found on the distribution of 
the various failure factors [1]. The largest share is held by external 
environmental conditions (36%), technological aspects (23%), and operational 
circumstances (13%). These are all more or less due to insufficient planning. 
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Fi?J. 1. Outfall proce,;s of system elements 
TrR = time to repair. 
TIlF = time between failures. 
~'F = time to failures 
Parameters of failure and reliability 
First of all the interpretation of parameters used are given: 
Defect: Not permissible deviation of a parameter. 
Deviation: Difference between real and nominal value of a parameter. 
Change: The deviation from nominal value in various instances. 
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Failure criteria: Deviations of given elements with given limits caused by 
changes after initial load. 
Reliability: At least one of the failure criteria of an initially perfect element is 
violated. 
Blackout: All functions of the object fall out. 
Partial failure: Some operational functions of the object fall out. 
Secondary failure: Failure, caused by a failure of another object. 
Life (t): Time interval is expressed in working hours from the beginning of the 
load till the moment of the failure causing not repairable defect. Life is treated 
as a continuous probability variable. 
Probability offailure (Outfall probability): The probability of an object's falling 
out within a given TJ < T interval. It can be expressed with the following 
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Fig. 2. Empirical curves of survival and failure probability 
distribution function: 
r 
P(Tf < T)=F(t)= Sf(t) dt. 
o 
(I) 
Probability of survival: is the complementary function of F(t), which is 
monotonously decreasing in case of non repairable, non regenerative systems: 
r 
P(Tf > T) = R(t) = 1-F(t) = 1- S f(t) dt . 
o 
(2) 
Survival probability curve: shows the percentage distribution as a function of 
time of elements ready for working (Fig. 2): 
b(t)=[l-F(t)]I00=l00[If(t)dt] =100R(t). (3) 
The reflected curve is the failure curve showing the empirical distribution of 
relative outfall frequency: 
1-b(t)= 100- L hj • 
j 
(4) 
Failurefrequency: It is the quotient of failure density and survival probability: 
. f(t) 
A(t)= R(t) . (5) 
i.(t) is constant when the distribution is exponential. Its value is estimated as 
follows: 
where c = number of failures, 
L1 t = measuring period, 
n = number of elements in the sample. 
(6) 
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Failure quota: The quotient of periodical frequency and measuring period; it's 
an empirical value of failure frequency for the given interval: 
P( )_ N(ti-1)-N(t;} t i - 1 ,ti - N(.) , 
t'-1 
where N(t;} = number of elements ready for working at ti time, 
N(ti_ d=the above number at time ti- 1. 
M ean life: is the mean value of life: 
00 
m=Tm= ! R(t)dt, 
(7) 
(8) 
Mean time between failures: is a mean time interval between two failures 
occurring during the analysis of many repairable units. When ;. = constant, 
then m = MT BF. It's value can be estimated with different methods. The more 
elements we consider, the smaller is the value of MT BF. (Fig. 1) Examining a 
finite number of system components, the time till the first failure (m i) can be 
defined for all the units. It should be divided by the number of components (N): 
(9) 
m and MT BF contain less information than the distribution function. The 
number of working elements in t = m time is depending on the type of 
distribution. 
Reliability parameters can be derived by: 
- laboratory observations of system elements using a model of operating 
conditions; 
- making use of failure statistics, based on usual workshop control. 
The first method gives exact information within reproducible laboratory 
conditions. It is suitable for studying failure types and grounds. There are no 
disturbing moments due to interaction between elements. The laboratory 
examination of elements by simulation is, however, very expensive. 
In the case of large mechanical systems only the second method may 
come into question. Its advantage is the larger sample size (depending on 
product type) obtained from processing user documentation. Besides sample 
size, sample independence and representativity are of utmost importance, as 
well as exact definition of failure, outfall and operating time. 
7 Periodica Polytechnica M. 30/3--4 
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Reliability of systems with independent elements 
According to the common practice of reliability theory, systems can be so 
long reduced, until their components, as secondary failures arise. Elements 
considered independent from the reliability's point of view are called structural 
elements. The reliability of the mechanical system is defined by the number and 
individual reliability of these, however, their connecting scheme has certain 
influence, as well. In the practice, there are serial and parallel connecting 
schemes. 
In a series connected system, the failure of any element leads to the outfall 
of the whole system. Further criteria are the followings: 
- the system contains finite number of elements, 
the system is non-regenerative, 
only total failures can be examined-partial analysis is not possible, 
all the failures are of stochastic nature, 
the failure frequency of the elements is constant, 
- the elements each are of identical importance. 
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Fiy. 3. Influence of different connection schemes on the system's reliability 
If a system has M different elements and meets the above conditions, then 
its survival probability is: 
M 
R(t)=Rdt)R 2 (t)·· .RM(t)= n Ri(t). (10) 
i= 1 
It can be seen from the above formula that reliability decreases with the 
number of elements connected in series. To raise the level of reliability, the 
method of reservation can be efficiently used which is realized by parallelly 
connected elements. In a parallelly connected system there are redundant 
elements which take over the function of other elements when needed. 
Therefore, total system outfall occurs only when all the redundant elements 
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drop out. The survival probability of systems with active redundancy is: 
M 
R(t)= 1- n [l-Rj(t)]. 
j= 1 
(11) 
On Fig. 3 the reliability of systems is shown as a function of connecting 
schemes (included mixed connection). 
Mechanical systems are, in general, serially connected with a large 
number of elements. 
Reliability of systems with secondary failures 
The dependence criteria toward system elements can not generally be 
realized in the practice. That means that the failure of one element causes 
sooner or later the failure of other elements, or parts. There are several 
reliability interactions (dynamic, kinematic, electrical) between certain system 
elements. The question is: how to define the elements or groups with mutual 
dependence, and how to examine the size, direction and time function of this 
dependence. To answer these questions is extremely difficult. According to our 
present knowledge, no general method exists, and very few research reports 
can be found even in the literature [4]. In the followings a method is introduced 
which~although it implies a lot of simplifications-may contribute to the 
definition of survival probability in systems with secondary failures. 
The failures of system elements in the course of operation will be called 
here as defect-events. Four types of impacts can be defined between two 
elements (E j and E) of the event set: 
1. The two elements are in mutual interaction, with the same or different 
intensity. 
2. Only Ej impacts Ej • 
3. Only Ej impacts E j • 
4. None of the elements impacts the other-they are independent defect-events 
from the reliability's point of view. 
There are basically two types of relationships to be distinguished. On the 
left side of Fig. 4 there is the event pair E2 - El with conditional type of 
Fig. 4. Basic relationships between event-pairs 
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relationship, and event pair E4 - E 3 with causal type of relationship. The solid 
line between event pairs shows strong interaction, the broken line designates a 
supposed weak interaction.* In technical systems failure occurs as causal 
interactions. 
Interactions between not independent event pairs are expressed as 
changes in probability occurrence of impacted events. In case of mechanical 
systems these probabilities may obviously only increase. Since we have a whole 
system to be analyzed, the interactions interpreted in a pairwise manner should 
be defined for all the event pairs of the event set. To follow such a complex 
failure procedure in the practice is extremely difficult. We may use, however, 
some characteristics of the so-called cross-impact method here, developed for 
long-range forecasting [3]. Let us introduce the following denotations to use 
this method for our reliability problem: 
The set of defect-events consisting of M elements of the mechanical system: 
Defect-event occurrence probabilities (for empirical analysis equal to the 
element failure ratios): 
P(E I)' P(E 2 ), ••• , P(E;), ... , P(E), ... , P(Eu)· 
The set of defect-events creates at every moment a total-probability system. 
All the different impairments of the system can be described: 
._(- - - - - 1 5 1·-\E 1 ,E2 ,·· .,Ei'·· .,Ej , ... ,EMI , 
._ (- - - - 1 5 2.- l E 1 ,E2 , ••. ,Ei'" .,Ej , ..• ,EMj , 
where r=2M. 
There is a state probability (Pk (5)) attached to every impairing state: 
r L Pd5)=L k= 1, ... , r. 
k=1 
Taking the time factor also into consideration, the input data for 
multiperiod cross impact method are the followings: 
* Interpretation: when El occurs within the given time interval, then there is a strong 
assumption, that E2 has occurred before. At the same time, E2 may occur without leading to the 
occurrence of E I' In case of causal relationships the occurrence of E4 results the occurrence of E 3' 
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P(Ej, t) = cumulative defect-event probability in period t. This is the probability 
of the i-th element's failure within the mechanical system, in period t, 
or earlier. 
p(E;, t)=the interval probability of E; defect-event in period t. It is the 
conditional probability of the i-th element's failure within the period 
t, given, that it has not failed previously: 
(E. )= P(E;, t)-P(E;, t-l) P pt I-P(E;,t-I)· (13) 
C = cross impact matrix, the elements C(Ej , E;) of which express the influence 
ofthej-th defect-event's occurrence (or non occurrence) on the occurrence 
of the i-th defect-event in subsequent periods. The constant values of the 
matrix are defined by expert estimates*--consequently they are quite 
subjective. 
When calculating the reliability of systems containing non-independent 
elements with mUltiperiod cross-impact method, the steps to be taken are the 
followings: 
1. The cumulative defect-event probabilities should be converted into interval 
probabilities. 
2. Using the values of the cross-impact matrix, the influence of all the events is 
aggregated on the events which have not occurred. 
3. Interval probabilities are modified by cross-impacts. 
4. For each defect-event in each period the fact of occurrence is examined with 
the help of random numbers. 
5. The Monte-Carlo simulation is continued until getting stable results. 
Computer simulation is done for all the non-independent event-pairs. 
This process is illustrated in case of Eland E2 defect-events by a three period 
probability model (Fig. 5). The non-regenerative impairing states referred to 
the last time of the individual periods can be described by defect-event 
probabilities modified by cross-impacts. 
In conformity with the basic axioms of probability theory, the following 
formula must be valid for interval probabilities: 
p(E;, t)= p(E;, tl E)P(Ej , t-I)+ p(E;, tl E) [1- P(Ej' t-I)] . (14) 
* It should be noted that C can be expressed in a form of a function, as well. Lipinski and 
Tydeman [5J proposed for example a new cross-impact term which is proportional to the 
derivated impacted variable (yJ 
Other, more complex terms may also be contained by C. The interactions between technical 
elements should always be expressed by functions. In the practice, however, these functions can 
not be defined; therefore, we have to come up with estimates. 
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Fiy. 5. Three period probability cross-impact model for E; and E j defect-events 
Based on (14) it is obvious that the interval probability of defect-event Ei 
is the weighted average of the two conditional interval-probabilities. The 
weighting factor is the cumulative probability of the earlier occurrence of the 
defect-event. Note that the conditional interval probability--expressing a 
causal relationship-is not equal to the conditional probability known from 
the classical probability theory. In the course of reliability analysis interval 
probability should be used.* 
Using the likelihood-multiplier method, the C(Ej , Ei ) cross-impacts are 
factors, the interval probability of Ei defect-event should be multiplied with, if 
the affecting defect-event occurred before [3]: 
P(Ei' t)C(Ej' EJ 
P(Ei' tl Ej ) = 1-P(Ei' t)+ p(EJ)C(Ej, Ei) . 
(I 5) 
After the necessary deductions the complementary interval probability is: 
(E. IE.)= P(Ei' t)-P(Ej, t-1)p(Ei, tiE) p pt ) 1-P(Ej ,t-1) (16) 
In summary, the characteristic features of the model are the followings: 
Numberableness: The defect-event system D is a finite set of mutually 
in teracted defect -even ts. 
* During cross-impact analysis the following future probabilities are searched for: the 
probability of the occurrence of event a, if event b has occurred before the occurrence of a. In the 
classical probability theory the question sounds like this: assuming that event b has occurred, 
how probable is that event a has also occurred? When analyzing dependent elements of 
mechanical systems, the question is the following: when in the course of future operation one of 
the structural elements breaks down, has this event any relation to a former break down of an 
other element? 
RELlABILlT)' OF MECHANICAL SYSTEMS 393 
Dichotomous variables: All the elements of D defect-event system have 
only two possible states: absolutely in gear and out of gear. 
Sequential characteristic,' The defect-events have a definite occurrence 
sequence which is incorporated in the model. 
M onotony The defect-events do not repeat themselves: if a system breaks 
down in the analyzed period, it can not be active again. 
It can be seen, the characteristics of the model are in proper conformity 
with the real behaviour of non-regenerative mechanical systems. Therefore, the 
model corresponds to the Boolean reliability model, as well. Regarding the 
latter there is one single exception: the assumed stochastical independence of 
the elements. Our main aim has been, however, to express just these 
interconnected relations in the reliability calculations. 
Example 
We will consider a tower crane here to illustrate the reliability analysis of 
mechanical systems. A sketch is shown on Fig. 6 of the crane which is to be used 
in building 16-level apartment houses. Main technical data: maximum load 8 t, 
maximum lifting height 60 m, lifting speed 22 m/min. 
The following theoretical and practical aspects have been taken into 
consideration when defining the connection scheme of the crane: 
1, It should contain all the crane elements, important from the point of view of 
failures. 
2, The scheme has a serially connected main branch, the elements of which 
represent one of the crane's main operating functions. The failure of these 
elements causes total system break down. 
3. Failure of parallelly connected elements does not lead to total system break 
down, since these elements are dispensable for quite a long time; their 
functions are subfunctions. Operating experience shows that in case of their 
failure the tasks of crane in building mechanization can fully be carried out. 
Connecting scheme of the tower crane is to be found on Fig. 7: there are 10 
subsystems connected in series and in total 32 structural elements defined. 
Failure data of n = 50 cranes have been prepared for analysis, for the 
period 1975-82, using failure statistics. A representative sampling was made, as 
a result of which cranes with different age were chosen. All the cranes were used 
for building panel houses; the operating conditions were, therefore, nearly the 
same. Differences (however, quite small: 9.5-11 hour/day) of actual working 
hours were compensated with the help of operation statistics. The moment of 
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Fig. 6. Sketch of tower crane, type KB 
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Fig. 7. Connecting scheme of the tower crane I. UNDERFRAME. 1. Under frame, spiders, 
stiffeners. 11. WHEEL BOXES. 2. Driven and running wheels. Ill. TOOTH WHEEL RIM. 3. 
Structural elements. IV. TRUCK. 4. Frame structure. 5. Balance weight. V. DRIVING 
SYSTEMS. 6. Turning mechanism. 7. Load lifting mechanism. 8. Jib pulling mechanism. 9. 
Carriage. 10. Creeping mechanism. VI. COLUMN. I!. Portal, trunk and appliances. 12. Trunk 
head and appliances. VII. JIB. 13. Structural elements of gib. VIn. HANGING TRUSS. 14. 
Rigging for bearing load and jib. 15. Hook block. 16. Creeping rigging. 17. Rigging for frame and 
bracket. IX. SAFETY EQUIPMENT. 18. Moment and load limiter. 19. Load indicator. 20. 
Safety limit switches. 2 I. Limit switches for loaded state. 22. Limit switches for jib state. 23. Limit 
switches for driving mechanism. 24. Limit switches for carriage. 25. Limit switches for creeping 
mechanism. X. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT. 26. Magnetic switches. 27. Elements of the main 
circuit. 28. Subcircuit elements. 29. Service elements for crane operation. 30. Service elements for 
crane assembling. 31. Illuminant elements for non-crane state. 32. Carriage cables 
the first failure was measured from the installation-the above mentioned 
compensation has been taken into consideration. 
The range of the sample is the operating time difference of the crane last 
failed (TMAX) and that of first failed (TM1N): 
R= TMAX - TM1N =4137 -20=4117 h. 
When setting up classes, the number of gaps between them should be: 
k ~ 5 19 n = 5 19 50 = 8,49 . 
Choosing k = 8, the length of the gaps is: 
R 4117 
d= k = -8- =514.6h. 
Doing all the calculations according to (3), the empirical survival 
probability curve is given (see Fig. 8, dotted line). This is a specific exponential 
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Fig. 8. Survival probability curves of the tower crane 
Open circles: Calculated R(t) values without cross-impacts 
Black dots: Calculated R(t) values with cross-impacts 
curve, typical for mechanical systems. This kind of curve is characteristic for 
large systems, containing many elements with different mean life and variance. 
It is very easy to recognize, that quite large number offailures occur in the early 
stage of operation. Analysis shows, that these failures are due to planning and 
production problems. It would, however, be rash, to judge the cranes negatively 
on the basis of the survival diagram. The failures experienced in the beginning 
of the operation are namely minor ones, they can be fixed within 1-2 hours. 
Theoretically, however, they should be treated as failures, since they are leading 
to total system outfall. 
The mean life of the tower crane according to (9) is, because cranes are 
naturally, repairable systems: 
=M7BF= 20+30+ ... +4137 =950 h 
m 50 .1 . 
Failure frequency: 
It is useful to find a theoretical distribution function to approximate the 
empirical survival curve. In case of exponential distribution, the survival 
probability for mean life is 37%. In our case however only 30% of all the 
elements (i.e. 15 cranes) are operating at this time. Because of this difference it is 
worth while experimenting with Weibull-distribution. Fig. 9. shows the 
definition ofthe Weibull parameters. A well fitting line can be drawn using the 
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Fig. 9. Definition of Weibull-distribution parameters 
characteristic points on the probability sheet which proves our assumption. 
This statement can be proved by a one-sided confidence analysis, not explained 
in detail here. 
The positional parameter in the Weibull-distribution is }' = 0, since 
failures occur already in early stage. The shape parameter f3 = 0.8 the dimension 
parameter IJ = 850 (Fig. 9). The Weibull function best approximating the 
empirical survival curve is (continuous line on Fig. 8): 
(t)p ( t )0.8 R(t)=e- -;; =e- 850 (17) 
Based on Weibull function: 
and m = 1.13 . 850 = 960.5 h, 
and with this 
m 
- =1([3)= 1.13, 
IJ 
R(t=m)=0.332. 
Dividing the interval 0-960 h into three parts of the same size (Fig. 5.), 
defining the numerical values of the model's input data, and using (10), the 
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survival probability of the tower crane for t = m 960 h operating time can be 
defined:* 
R(t) = RI(t) RII(t) RIII(t) Rly(t) Ry(t) Ryl(t) RylI(t) RYIII(t)Rlx(t)Rx(t) 
= 0.999 . 0.999 . 0.999 . 0.998 . 0.566 . 0.998 . 0.999 . 
. 0.979' 0.969' 0.605 =0.3222, 
where R1(t), ... , Rx(t) are the cumulative survival probabilities (failure quotas) 
of the independent main units (Fig. 7.) in the third part of the operating interval. 
This value-like the calculated values of R(t) for t = 320 hand t = 640 h-
adjusts itself without significant difference to the (17) Weibull function. 
Next step was to set up the cross-impact matrix. Cross-impact values 
were estimated by an expert group consisting of engineers and crane operating 
personnel. One of the most interesting experience of the analysis was to find out 
that this expert group failed in estimating the failure cross-impacts for the 10 
main units-they succeeded only in the case of the 32 element matrix. The 
interpretation is that in case of technical equipment a connection scheme 
breaked down to subunits or to components is needed to do the estimations. 
This was a very complex and long task, since N 2 -N =322 -32 992 elements 
were to be defined for the whole system. It is to be noted that cca. 80% of the 
elements equal to zero. 
Then the cross-impact values were aggregated. Fig. 10 shows the cross-
impact matrix, giving qualitatively the dependence relations among the 10 
main units of the crane. Note that the cross-impact matrix is not symmetrical. 
Between main units, there are failure connections of different intensity and 
direction; they are, consequently, not totally independent. Our preassumption 
has been proved by this fact: the more we split up a mechanical system, the 
more interconnected is the generated event-set from reliability's point of view. 
Input data-since they are service data of the whole system-contain the 
causal cross-impacts between main units, as well. 
To make use of the probability cross-impact model, three further outside 
events were generated. They represent most frequent events occurring in the 
course of operation, thus influencing significantly the failures of main units 
(Fig. 10). These outside events are: 01 = additional load caused by wind (higher 
than permissible) .. 02 = operation in extraordinarily unfavourable environment 
(e.?}. vitriol-plant, cement plant) .. 03 = careless assembling/disassembling when 
illstallill?} the crane at Cl new site. The cumulative probabilities in the three 
* Since the tower crane does not contain spare or substituting elements, the resultant reliability 
of subsystems V., VIII., IX., and X. cannot be defined with (I I)-namely these elements are not 
redundant. Therefore, during calculation only the main line elements connected in series have 
been taken into consideration. 
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Fig. 10. Cross-impact matrix 
Black square: strong cross-impact 
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periods examined, are in sequence: 
P(O 1) = [0.04; O.OS; 0.12J . 
P(02) = [0.10; 0.1 0; 0.1 OJ . 
P(03) = [0.10; 0.20; 0.30J . 
Note, that the case of catastrophic failure has been excluded. 
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Attaching numerical values to the qualitative probabilities according to 
Ellzer [3J, and replaced the results of the computer run in (10), the following 
values are obtained: 
R(t=320)=OAlS. 
R(t=640)=0.255. 
R(t=960)=0.130. 
The adjusted Weibull function (broken line on Fig. 8) is: 
( t )0.75 R(t)=e- 400 (IS) 
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Mean life of the crane: 
rn' =468 h. 
Regarding the curve of (18), and the value of rn', the common impact of the 
three outside events decreasing the system's reliability significantly, can well be 
appreciated. The correctness of the numerical values got, equals that of expert's 
estimation. 
Conclusions 
When defining the reliability of complex systems, we can not assume 
independence among system elements and between system and environment. 
Those empirical or experimental methods should systematically be searched 
for, by the help of which interactions can be explored and analyzed exactly 
enough. To have an adequate and total idea of system operation influenced by 
environmental effects, is particularly important in the design phase of new 
machines and equipments. This knowledge may contribute to decrease 
failures in operating systems and to design maintenance more objectively. In 
the course of our analysis a lot of partial results were obtained, concerning the 
reliability of crane elements. All these may be used for further developments. 
The procedure proposed and introduced here is general enough to be 
used widely. The application of methods like this, however, demands a sound 
background of information-it can, therefore, be proposed only for users 
having the necessary level of organization, and the failure statistics needed. 
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